The result was that the transfer to Aareal was an effective legal assignment. But all was not lost for messaging. On or shortly before the decision began in August 2016, Aareal criticized him for the contractual construction rights. Thus, the courier again had its hands on the steering wheel. But most of the time, it`s confusing, self-reprehensible things. How can an employer exercise contract rights – such as giving instructions – if they have transferred them to their funder? I imagine that an employer can act as an intermediary. But this argument was not executed in the mailbox. This is not surprising: a bank would hardly allow an employer to hire it under agency law. The dual thinking inherent in the obligation in the mailbox (and in many attribution warnings) only reinforces the view that security responsibilities are not the right tool. Certainly, O`Farrell J was not tempted to infer from the words a kind of distorted assignment that is not an attribution. But at least we now have the TCC decision in Mailbox (Birmingham) Ltd v Galliford Try Construction Ltd. O`Farrell J properly analyzes the effect of the type of allocation provisions that are likely to be put in place by donors. Shortly after the construction contract was executed, Aareal`s lawyers sent a notice of order to Galliford Try.
The press release was signed by Mailbox and stated that all Of Mailbox`s “rights, interests and benefits” under the contract “belong to Aareal.” I`ve always thought that these tasks were pretty futile, no matter which side of the fence I`ve done, but it`s amazing how many lawyers are too afraid to get away from it. It`s interesting to read. I have compared this to buying a new car with a loan, just for the bank manager, to take the keys and the steering wheel as collateral, and I always insist that the borrower give him a lift back to his branch. Wouldn`t it be better to get behind the wheel if you want someone else to drive? The confused rigmarole of such commands gives no one what they really need. The 2011 financing agreements between Mailbox and Aareal included a bond that the bank took guarantees for its loan. It was written in fairly usual terms. Among other things, it provided for Mailbox to assign its rights “from time to time” under a wide range of contracts “in which it participates” “for reasons of absolute security.” In addition, attribution decisions had to be notified. Maybe it`s going to be all right. Or, like me, you might think that the whole problem of security allocation was an unnecessary detour. Isn`t it time for obligations to be designed to reflect the real world of construction, instead of stretching language and concepts to cover all cases and not satisfy anyone? O`Farrell J had little difficulty deciding that there had been a legal transfer of Mailbox`s rights to Aareal (i.e., an assignment in accordance with the requirements of Section 136, paragraph 1, of the Property Act 1925). In particular, the use of inconsistent language is a problem with the imputation of obligations and related opinions (at least in the construction field).
For example, references to royalty fees are mixed non-edibically with words that refer to attribution. This overflowing approach to development is undoubtedly intended to protect the interests of a funder, but it creates a kind of alphabet soup. The wording in the mailbox is typical. Excellent blog – clearly spells out the law of unintended consequences, if the approach does not take into account the effects of the tight needs of donors – or lawyers funders. If only the outrage of a blogger solved problems. Unfortunately, funders and their lawyers still often insist that employers confer rights, regardless of the inconsistency that results. But to solve the problems in court, O`Farrell J`s judgment usefully reminds us of some basics: the question arose in the context of a decision. Did the employer Mailbox have the right to make a decision on its own behalf against