“71. I turn to the provision of section 127, paragraph 3. The Consumer Credit Act 1974 contains many requirements regarding the form and content of regulated agreements. Parliament stressed that certain obligations are so important that non-compliance automatically and inflexibly results in a ban on the execution of an execution warrant, regardless of the circumstances. These commitments are defined in sections 127 (3) and 4. In these two subsections, Parliament has deliberately chosen to exclude consideration of what is fair and equitable in the specific case. The latter approach, which allowed the Tribunal to examine the circumstances of this case, was adopted as a general rule in section 127, paragraph 1. Paragraphs 127 (3) and (4) are express exceptions to the general rule. With regard to the limitation of these two exceptions, it should be calculated that the sanction, which is generally related to non-compliance with the legal provisions, was not sufficient to ensure compliance with the obligation to include all the conditions set out in the agreement (section 61, paragraph 1, point a), or the obligation to provide copies and termination rights (sections 62 to 64).
A little more drastic was needed to draw attention to the need for lenders to strictly comply with these particular obligations. (b) a statement that the credit limit is set from time to time by the lender as part of the agreement and that it will be communicated to the debtor; (10) Counsel for HFC Bank argued that the clause relating to the manner in which the credit ceiling is set in paragraph 3 of Schedule 6 of the 1983 regulations must be interpreted in the sense that the manner in which the credit limit between the parties is set for the purposes of the agreement must be defined. Counsel submitted that this was indicated, namely released from time to time by the bank and the debtor. This means that it is at their absolute discretion, without any restrictions being imposed. Counsel for HFC Bank also argued that the wording used in Condition 3 could be characterized as an expression of the “credit limit.” He invoked the manner in which the “credit limit” in paragraph 8, paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 of the 1983 Regulation could be expressed for information contained in regulated consumer credit contracts, such as a declaration that the credit limit is set from time to time by the lender as part of the agreement and that it will be communicated to the debtor.